Ethical ideology is predicted to play a role in the occurrence of workplace deviance. Forsyths (1980) Ethics Position Questionnaire measures two dimensions of ethical ideology: idealism and relativism. It is hypothesized that idealism will be negatively correlated with employee deviance while relativism will be positively related. Further, it is predicted that idealism and relativism will interact in such a way that there will only be a relationship between idealism and deviance when relativism is higher. Results supported the hypothesized correlations and (...) idealism and relativism interacted to predict organizational deviance. Idealism was a significant predictor of interpersonal deviance, but no interaction was found. (shrink)

A far-reaching and influential view in evolutionary biology claims that species are cohesive units held together by gene flow. Biologists have recognized empirical problems facing this view; after sharpening the expression of the view, we present novel conceptual problems for it. At the heart of these problems is a distinction between two importantly different concepts of cohesion, what we call integrative and response cohesion. Acknowledging the distinction problematizes both the explanandum of species cohesion and the explanans of gene flow that (...) are central to the view we discuss. We conclude by tracing four broader implications for the study and conceptualization of species. (shrink)

The use of deception in medical care is highly suspect in this country. Yet there is one condition for which deception is often used as a diagnostic tool. Nonepileptic seizures, a psychiatric condition in which emotional or psychological conflicts manifest themselves unconsciously through bodily symptoms, are currently diagnosed by a procedure called “provocative saline infusion.” The test is fundamentally deceptive, requiring the physician to intentionally and directly lie to the patient, causing the patient to believe that the administered solution caused (...) his seizures. Without such deception, the test might be useless. (shrink)

A longitudinal study of 308 white -collar U.S. employees revealed that feelings of hope and gratitude increase concern for corporate social responsibility. In particular, employees with stronger hope and gratitude were found to have a greater sense of responsibility toward employee and societal issues; interestingly, employee hope and gratitude did not affect sense of responsibility toward economic and safety/quality issues. These findings offer an extension of research by Giacalone, Paul, and Jurkiewicz.

The concept of anxiety has long held a central place in psychoanalytic theories of mind and treatment. Yet, in recent years, data from the neurosciences and from pharmacological studies have posed a compelling challenge to psychoanalytic models of anxiety. One major outcome of these studies is the realization that anxiety both organizes and disorganizes, that it can be both symptom and signal. In _Anxiety as Symptom and Signal_, editors Steven Roose and Robert Glick have brought together distinguished contributors to (...) address these different dimensions of anxiety. A section of original papers on "Anxiety as Symptom" covers evolutionary, neuroanatomical, genetic, and developmental perspectives. A complementary section on "Anxiety as Signal" focuses on the meanings and functions of anxiety in the clinical process; contributions address anxiety in its ego-psychological, intersubjective, and relational dimensions. The illuminating, readable collection will broaden clinicians' awareness of the diverse research findings that now inform our understanding of anxiety. No less importantly, it will deepen their appreciation of the richly variegated ways that anxiety can shape, and be shaped by, the clinical process. (shrink)

Arthur Miller is one of the most important and enduring playwrights of the last fifty years. This new edition of The Theater Essays has been expanded by nearly fifty percent to include his most significant articles and interviews since the book's initial publication in 1978. Within these pages Miller discusses the roots of modern drama, the nature of tragedy, and the state of contemporary theater; offers illuminating observations on Ibsen, Strindberg, Chekhov, O'Neill, and Williams; probes the different approaches and attitudes (...) toward theater in Russia, China, and at home; and, of course, provides valuable insights into his own vast dramatic corpus. For this edition the literary chronology and cast and production information have been updated, and an extensive new bibliography has been added. The Theater Essays confirms Arthur Miller's standing as a brilliant, eloquent commentator on drama and culture. No one interested in theater should be without this definitive collection. (shrink)

Perceptual symbol systems form a theoretically plausible alternative to amodal symbol systems. At this point it is unclear whether there is any truly diagnostic empirical evidence to decide between these systems. We outline some possible avenues of research in the domain of language comprehension that might yield such evidence. Language comprehension will be an important arena for tests of the two types of symbol systems.

Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. The companion volume, Genes and (...) the Agents of Life, explores the theme in the biological sciences. Written with verve and clarity, this ambitious book will appeal to a broad swathe of professionals and students in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the history of the behavioural and human sciences. You can download the table of contents here. (shrink)

Individuals are a prominent part of the biological world. Although biologists and philosophers of biology draw freely on the concept of an individual in articulating both widely accepted and more controversial claims, there has been little explicit work devoted to the biological notion of an individual itself. How should we think about biological individuals? What are the roles that biological individuals play in processes such as natural selection (are genes and groups also units of selection?), speciation (are species individuals?), and (...) organismic development (do genomes code for organisms)? Much of our discussion here will focus on organisms as a central kind of biological individual, and that discussion will raise broader questions about the nature of the biological world, for example, about its complexity, its organization, and its relation to human thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Berkeley and Scepticism: A Fatal Dalliance Robert A. Imlay This article is divided into three sections. In the first section I try to show how Berkeley inadvertently commits himself to scepticism or subjectivism by employing against the representational realist an argument that seeks to identify all sensible quaUties regardless of degree with pleasure or pain viewed as feeling states. An appeal to the act-object distinction as a way (...) of avoiding this result is shown to be futile because ofthe purely grammatical nature ofthat distinction. Berkeley must, ifhe can do so consistently, radically change course and attack the alleged identity head-on. In view of that I try to show more clearly in the second section why the sceptic or subjectivist—and Berkeleyhimself—are convinced that the identity forces itselfupon us. At the same time I try to explain why even a representationaUsm that agrees to identify heat, for example, with felt heat but clings to something unfelt like heat qua heat to be found in the fire is no answer to these philosophers. If it were, admittedly, the identity would not have to be attacked head-on. Against this form of representational readism an appeal is once more made to the purely grammatical nature of the act-object distinction which in our view Ues behind Berkeley's anti-representationalist Ukeness principle. In the third section, attacking the identity head-on I try to show the identification of heat and pain, to continue with that example, assumes that all differences between the two would have to be transparent to consciousness. And that is already to assume what needs to be proved, namely, that there is no epistemologically opaque, mind-independent heat ofthe fire. Unfortunately, this Une ofattack is notopen toBerkeley, because hehas otherarguments designedto show that there is, indeed, no mind-independent heat of the fire. If, on the other hand, he rejected the transparency of consciousness, he would run the risk—as he is fully aware—of allowing in scepticism or subjectivism through another door. Finally, Berkeley's attempt to avoid scepticism or subjectivism by making sensible qualities objects ofperception is seen to run afoul ofthe purely grammatical nature of the act-object relation, the subject with which this paper more or less began. Volume XVIII Number 2 501 ROBERT A. IMLAY One tried but perhaps not always true way of dealing with the philosophical sceptic or subjectivist is to give her all the rope that she requires in order to hang herself. This is the way of Descartes in the first and the beginningofthe secondMeditation where sceptical doubt, indeed denial, pushed to its limit, is supposed to demonstrate to the philosopher that he exists. It is, however, also the way ofBerkeley at least to the extent that he is prepared to employ a sceptical or subjectivist argument to arrive at a position that is supposed to be in the final analysis incompatible with scepticism or subjectivism. Such astrategyis, needless to say, not withoutits dangers. Indeed, it is because ofthem thatjust such a strategy, ifit could succeed, would constitute areal epistemic tourdeforce. The most obvious and pressing danger is that by unabashedly employing a sceptical or subjectivist argument one inevitably becomes committed to scepticism or subjectivism oneself. Nor is that danger to be averted merely by quaUfying the argument in question in such a way that it loses its sceptical or subjectivist bite. For at least in the case of Berkeley and the particular argument of his that we have in mind, it can lose that bite only by ceasing to be itself. By the same token it will leave intact or at least play no role in the dismantling of a position that on further analysis is supposed to be not only compatible with scepticism or subjectivism but, ifBerkeley is right, ultimately vindicates it. The argument is the one in which Berkeley insists on the identity, regardless ofdegree, ofall the sensible qualities—heat and cold, sweet and bitter, for example—with either pleasure or pain viewed as feeling states in order to put them in the mind along with the latter.1 This argument is essentially a sceptical or subjectivist one and, if he were to abandon it... (shrink)

This book argues that the Russian-British philosopher Isaiah Berlin should primarily be understood through British idealism. Though he adopted Kantian methodology and a view of people as purposive beings, he rejected the Idealists' monism and theories of positive liberty. Robert A. Kocis demonstrates how, like Michael Oakeshott and R. G. Collingwood, Berlin can be seen as a 'post-Idealist' thinker, invested in the implications of that rich tradition.

This note analyses the significance of the name Laelia in Martial 10.68. It is argued that the name evokes Laelia, wife of Scaevola Augur and mother-in-law of Crassus Orator, who was famed for her elegant Latin. The punch line of Martial’s epigram is that his Laelia, conversely to the above, speaks like the Greek prostitute Lais.

Pharmacy Ethics: A Foundation for Professional Practice provides a model for examining and resolving ethical dilemmas, thereby helping student pharmacists understand the ethical decision-making process in professional practice.

Dominant views of personal identity in philosophy take some kind of psychological continuity or connectedness over time to be criterial for the identity of a person over time. Such views assign psychological states, particularly those necessary for narrative memory of some kind, special importance in thinking about the nature of persons. The extended mind thesis, which has generated much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, holds that a person’s psychological states can physically extend beyond that person’s (...) body. Since “person” is a term of both metaphysical and moral significance, and discussions of both extended minds and personal identity have often focused on memory, this article explores the relevance of extended cognition for the identity of persons with special attention to neuroethics and memory. (shrink)

Biogerontologist Aubrey de Grey has suggested that one of the reasons we as a society invest so little in research on combating aging is because we are in an intellectual trance. We think the effort will be futile: aging is immutable, so why try? A healthy skepticism can be a good thing but it is a major mistake to bet against the irresistible force of inexorable technological progress. Over the next few decades, nanotechnology will come to play a pivotal role (...) in the solution to the problem of human aging. Medical nanorobotics, if it can be made to work, can unquestionably offer convenient solutions to all known causes of age-related damage and most likely can also successfully address any new causes of senescence that remain undiscovered today. (shrink)

L'argument de Descartes selon lequel son essence s'identifie avec sa pensée s'expose à la critique destructrice de Leibniz. En même temps l'interprétation de l'argument donnée par Arnauld s'avère défectueuse. Car elle repose sur l'hypothèse que Descartes doutait des idées claires et distinctes qui sont présentés à l'esprit. En fait Descartes ne doutait jamais de telles idées en de telles circonstances. Et ce n'est qu'après que l'hypothèse du malin génie lui permettait de douter de l'identité de son essence et de sa (...) pensée. A ce moment-là, d'ailleurs, il était prêt à admettre la possibilité que celle-là soit complètement différente de celle-ci. Mais l'interprétation d'Arnauld ne lui permet point de comprendre une telle possibilité. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory has become a central issue in the literature on business ethics / business and society. There are, however, a number of problems with stakeholder theory as currently understood. Among these are: 1) the lack of a coherent justificatory framework, 2) the problem of adjudicating between stakeholders, and 3) the problem of stakeholder identification. In this essay, I propose that a possible source of obligations to stakeholders is the principle of fairness (or fair play) as discussed in the political (...) philosophic literature of Rawls, Simmons, and Cullity among others. The principle of fairness states that, “Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually beneficial scheme of co-operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding, there exist obligations of fairness on the part of these persons or groups to co-operate in proportion to the benefits accepted.” In this essay I discuss the gaps in the current stakeholder literature, elucidate and defend a principle of fairness that fills the gap, compare the fairness model to other similar models of business ethics, and draw some conclusions for the future of stakeholder theory. (shrink)